This post is a collection of quick thoughts. My goal in writing it is to come closer to an emotional resolution on the topic of fallibilism and the apparent problem posed by the reflexivity thereof.

Does absolute certainty exist?

First, one can never prove with absolute certainty that absolute certainty is not possible, because to do so would be at once self-contradictory. However, this doesn’t prove that absolute certainty is attainable; it leaves the question open.

A single example seems to prove the existence of absolute certainty: I can be absolutely certain of my own existence. I can also be certain that I hold beliefs, since I hold the belief that I exist, and since to deny the claim that I hold beliefs would be to hold belief in its negation. So then I conclude that there are indeed propositions I can form which seem absolutely certain to me; though the scope of conclusions I can draw from them seems limited.

Furthermore, although the fact that I exist seems incontrovertible, its implications and the exact language in which it is expressed (e.g. the denotation and connotation of the concepts “I” and “to exist”) are subject to doubt and revision.

Is there an observer-independent reality?

A separate metaphysical question is whether reality exists in some form independently of any conscious observer (i.e. whether there is an “independent reality”).

This seems inherently undecidable. An observer cannot verify or falsify the belief that an independent reality exists, since the very questioning implies the existence of an observer, which inescapably necessitates the act of observation.

Does there exist a complete and true description of reality?

A further epistemological and potentially metaphysical question is whether there exists a complete and true description of reality.

To answer this question, one first needs to be precise about what is meant by “a complete and true description of reality.” I would be content to apply that title to a system of propositions by means of which one can for any phenomenal event: (1) categorize that event, (2) make arbitrarily accurate and precise predictions with regard to that event, and (3) generate justified explanations for that event.

Godel’s Incompleteness Theorems tell that a formal system that encompasses arithmetic on natural numbers cannot be both complete and consistent (“complete” in the sense that one can prove every true proposition that can be expressed in its language, and “consistent” in the sense that one can never prove both a proposition and its opposite); and moreover that it cannot prove its own consistency. Insofar as a formal system that categorizes and explains all phenomenal events must be powerful enough to encompass arithmetic on natural numbers (a point that could perhaps be disputed but seems likely to me), this seems to place a strong limit on a complete and true description of reality. It remains unclear whether “informal” systems could achieve a complete and true description of reality.

As I considered elsewhere, the act of questioning Reality presupposes and requires a framework that shapes how responses will be understood. What is answered and how it is understood depends on what I ask, how I ask, and what I mean by it. However, there is no position outside the process of questioning from which to evaluate it without being subject to it. The infinite regress therefore required to satisfy questioning ensures that reality is forever open to complete linguistic closure.

If we had a complete and true description of reality, would we know that we do?

A further epistemological question is whether we could verify a complete and true description of reality even if we had it.

On this point I believe we could not.

The Munchhausen trilemma problematizes ultimate justification. It proposes that the effort to ultimately justify any proposition must terminate with one of three unsatisfactory results: (1) the chain of justification terminates with foundational axioms that are dogmatic and not further justified; or (2) the chain of justification is infinite, with every truth having a prior justification; or (3) the chain of justification closes upon itself, producing logical circularity.

It is also unclear how one could solve the problem of induction, i.e. how one could be sure that the future will resemble the past. No matter how well a description were to stand the test of time, there would remain ultimate doubt about its future applicability.

On fallibilism

Fallibilism is the position that no beliefs or claims to knowledge are infallible or beyond the possibility of revision under new evidence or scrutiny, except perhaps knowledge of one’s own existence and the knowledge that one holds beliefs as discussed above (though even these may be subject to revision based on scrutiny of the language used to convey them).

Belief in fallibilism follows from the beliefs in the section immediately above, since the ultimate justification of even a complete and true description of reality seems to be dogmatic, circular, or infinitely elusive.

That fallibilism is itself a fallible standpoint is not self-contradictory but self-exemplary.

Ultimate uncertainty is not total uncertainty

If quantum mechanics teaches us one thing, it is that ultimate uncertainty does not imply total uncertainty. Despite fundamental limits to knowledge, such as the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle and the ultimately stochastic nature of reality, we can make very precise predictions within those limits that enable us to build reliable technologies.

Conclusions

I can’t assume that I exist within an independent reality with an objective truth of the matter, but neither can I assume that I do not. My prior philosophical work is all about seeking a way to recover sanity, meaning, and ethical practices in light of this fundamental uncertainty.

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